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¹¹The Internationalist; ¹²New Society; ¹³Times Lit. Supplement; ¹⁴Belfast Newsletter; ¹⁵Irish Post; ¹⁶International Affairs; ¹⁷Sunday Independent; ¹⁸Asian Review; ¹⁹The Friend; ²⁰Afro-Asian Affairs; ²¹E. African Standard; ²²Sunday Times; ²³New Community; ²⁴The Times; ²⁵Information; ²⁶The Observer; ²⁷Irving Horowitz; ²⁸The Guardian; ²⁹Peace News; ³⁰The Freethinker; ³¹The Spectator; ³²The Geographical Magazine; ³³New World; ³⁴Melbourne Age; ³⁵The Economist; ³⁶Neue Zürcher Zeitung; ³⁷Resurgence; ³⁸Feedback; ³⁹Time Out; ⁴⁰Evening Standard; ⁴¹Tribune of Australia; ⁴²The Scotsman; ⁴³The Financial Times; ⁴⁴New Statesman; ⁴⁵The Nation; ⁴⁶Bernard Levin.

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Muslim. The vast majority of Pathans and Baluchis adhere, moreover, to the Hanafi school of the Sunni sect of Islam, which is in harmony with at least two of the states, Pakistan and Afghanistan, both of which are predominantly Sunni.

Religious uniformity is not complete, however. Over 90% of Iran's population belongs to the Shi'a sect of Islam, a fact which sets the mainly Sunni Iranian Baluchis apart from the dominant Persians (and from their provincial cohabitants, the Seistanis) not only in culture and language but in religious sectarian interests as well.

Even without such sectarian differences, it would still be very easy to overstate the strength of the Islamic bond between the tribesmen and the rest of society in these states. To begin with, there is a vast discrepancy between the Islam of the ruling elites and the Islam of the tribesmen. Most Baluchis and Pathans are illiterate and non-urbanized, and their cultures display heavy traces of their nomadic and warrior traditions. Hence, their devotion to Islam, while considerable (on occasion even fanatical), is typically simple and unadorned, and their understanding of it limited and riddled with superstition.¹⁸ Tribal religious observance thus provides the host society with grounds for ridicule as well as for praise.

Another underlying handicap on the Islamic bond is the powerful loyalty to clan and tribe which persists among tribesmen and which, as many current observers of the disunited ranks of Afghan rebels have detected, continues to claim their highest allegiance.¹⁹ This has acted as a brake on the utility of Islam as an integrative force, and, as has long been the case among both Baluchis and Pathans, on all efforts to weld solidarity among the tribal units themselves.

equally basic reason for Islam's failure to ensure greater cohesion between the tribes and their host societies, however, is the obvious fact that religion is vulnerable to political exploitation and manipulation, and has been widely employed as a partisan political weapon by both governments and oppositions in all three countries.

So long as the secular-minded Pahlavis ruled Iran, for example, sectarian differences between the Baluchis and Persians were largely muted. But domination of Iran by revengeful and militantly religious Shi'ite clerics after the Shah's overthrow in 1979 opened wide the ancient Sunni-Shi'a cleavage in that land. Sunni Baluchis clearly had reason to distrust the Islamic pretensions of the Khomeini regime, when it reportedly favoured (and armed) the local Shi'ite Seistanis.²⁰

Pakistan, for another example, having been created only recently and at great human cost specifically as a homeland for the Muslim religious community of the Indian subcontinent, has relied upon the Islamic bond to hold intact its diverse society more than either of the other two states. It was declared an Islamic Republic in 1964; and special Islamic provisions are well entrenched in its constitution. The Martial Law regime of General Zia ul-Haq took a further step towards an 'Islamized' Pakistan in February 1978 with the formal promulgation of Islamic laws, most notably in regard to penalties for criminal offences. These developments have been greeted with surprising hostility by tribesmen (including devout Muslims), many of whose leaders tend to view them as politically inspired efforts to increase the popularity and thus to strengthen the central government.

It is apparent that Islam, when politicized, is as much given to division as to cohesion.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND CULTURAL VALUES

Geographically isolated on the fringes of more powerful civilizations for much of their modern history, Pathans and Baluchis have been relatively successful in preserving intact traditional cultural values and forms of social organization. Now that their homelands have been absorbed into the modern state system, with its characteristic emphasis on centralized authority and on political and economic integration, unprecedented stress on the most basic elements of Pathan and Baluch identity is inevitable. Neither group is likely to escape profound social and cultural transformation. The exact character of their adaptation is likely to vary considerably, however, since the two tribal groups are in key respects very different.

The difference is most apparent in social structure. Both groups are highly segmented into tribes, clans and sub-clans. But whereas

Baluch tribes, at least in Pakistan, are typically centrally organized and Baluch tribesmen essentially subordinate clients of powerful chiefs (*tumandars* or *sardars*), Pathan tribes are characteristically de-centralized and clan headmen (*khans*) must compete for followers in a cultural milieu in which male individuality and equality are valued above all else.

Pathan tribal organization is at bottom anarchic. A man is Pathan less by virtue of his enrolment in a particular group than by his manifest behavioural conformity to traditional Pathan customs – foremost among which is the unremitting assertion in every public forum of male autonomy. As the Pathans say, one must not merely speak Pashtu, one must also do Pashtu. Would-be leaders must live up to rigorous standards of bravery and risk-taking, defence of honour, responsibility and aggressiveness. To meet social expectations of hospitality (*melmastia*), Pathans must be lavish hosts, regardless of expense, and must extend protection to their guests, at whatever peril to their personal safety. Baluch tribal organization, on the other hand, is essentially hierarchic, and submission to the authority of the chief is the basis of tribal affiliation.

In reality, Pathan tribal organization of course falls well short of its egalitarian ideal: major distinctions of rank, as between the landed khans and their landless retainers, are obviously characteristic of Pathan society.²¹ At the same time, in Baluch tribal organization the authority of the sardars is by no means absolute or free of social restraints in spite of the hierarchical structure of the chain of command.²² Nonetheless, there is a substantial difference between Pathan society, where submission to leadership is generally hedged with qualifications and is at least partially a matter of choice, and a large component of Baluch society, where dominance by the sardar and his section leaders (*waderas* or *takkaris*) is the central element in tribal organization.

These differences aside, the fact remains that neither Baluchis nor Pathans can escape the transformative impact of modern society. For the Pathans, reckless spending and indifference to the accumulation of wealth for its own sake are increasingly untenable values. For the Baluchis, the sardari system is a pale substitute for the power of modern bureaucracy.

Whether the tribesmen are to have much voice in defining the terms of contemporary change has much to do with the surviving strength of traditional tribal or sub-tribal loyalties. We observed earlier that unification of the separate tribes had proven a virtually impossible task among both Pathans and Baluchis throughout history. It is far from certain even today that pan-tribal allegiance to a *Pathan* nation or to a *Baluch* nation has effectively replaced narrower loyalty to the tribe, clan or sub-clan.

Pathan nationalism has not really been put to a major test in Pakistan since 1947. In so far as we accept the behaviour of tribal insurgents in neighbouring Afghanistan as a reliable guide to Pathans in general, there can hardly be much confidence in their ability or willingness to rise above inter-tribal feuds and rivalries.

Baluch nationalism, on the other hand, has been subjected to a fairly clear test in Pakistan during the course of the insurrection of the 1970s. The results were not spectacular. The great majority of Baluch tribes either sided with the government or, as was the case with the tribes of the Makran area, simply sat out the conflict. No doubt, the government resorted to bribery and intimidation of tribal leaders to achieve this result. No doubt, either, there were elements in many tribes which supported the insurgents, sometimes actively. The fact remains, however, that very few tribes took the field in the most recent test of Baluch nationalism.²³

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

It is hazardous to generalize about economic conditions in the tribal areas of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. One reason for this is an acute shortage of current, reliable and comparable statistical information on income distribution, morbidity and life expectancy that would provide accurate clues to living standards. Another is that conditions vary considerably from place to place, as between the sedentary agriculturalist Pathans of the Frontier's regular districts and the freer, but probably poorer, Pathans of the highland Tribal Agencies. There is not much doubt, however, that the tribal

areas are among the more impoverished and least developed regions of all three countries.

According to data compiled by Burki, economic power in Pakistan is clearly concentrated in the Punjab; Baluchistan and the NWFP are economically the weakest of the country's four provinces.²⁴ According to Issawi, Iran's southern regions, in particular the two most heavily Baluchi-settled provinces of Kerman and Baluchistan-Seistan, are much poorer than the northern regions.²⁵

In certain respects, at least, conditions seem most severe in Baluchistan. By and large, the Baluchis occupy the driest, hottest and most desolate parts of it. What little precipitation there is in the province occurs at the higher elevations in the northern districts, where few Baluchis are settled. Cultivable land is very limited. Subsistence farming, often combined with semi-nomadic pastoralism, is typical. Baluchis have the highest rate of illiteracy in Pakistan (the most illiterate eight of West Pakistan's 45 districts in 1961 were all in Baluchistan);²⁶ and informants report high rates of disease and malnutrition.

Apart from their relatively impoverished condition, the tribal areas of all three countries share at least one other fundamental characteristic: their local economies are all gradually being integrated with the modern and market-oriented national economies and, simultaneously, being brought under a vast web of central bureaucratic controls. In practical terms, this has meant the construction of roads and ~~and~~ ^{and} truck transport, the spread of commercialized agriculture and the institutions and technology to sustain it, the promotion of land reforms and of changes in systems of land tenure, increasing pressures for the migration of local manpower to distant cities and to areas abroad, the opening of new industries and – above all – a steady decline in the tribesmen's traditional economic autonomy.

Salzman provides an especially good description of the way in which Iran's Baluch tribes have been economically 'encapsulated' over the years. Stripped of their function as war leaders, the sardars of such tribes as the Yarahmadzai serve as local functionaries in a vast clientelist network reaching from Teheran down to the smallest tribal village. The sardars act as middlemen or brokers for the bureaucracy's transactions with the tribesmen, channelling information and resources into tribal areas, lobbying for tribal interests, and doling out government patronage in return for political docility.²⁷ Economic integration, not necessarily improvement in the economic lot of tribesmen, is the objective.

This basic economic transformation has occurred in all three countries regardless of the regime in power, although some leaders, such as Iran's Mohammad Reza Shah, Pakistan's Bhutto, or the Marxists who came to power in Afghanistan in 1978, have shown more determination than others to accelerate the process. With his 'White Revolution' of 1963, the Shah launched a well-publicized bureaucratic effort of socio-economic reform (see below). Bhutto, with as keen an appreciation of the political uses of economic incentives as the Shah, greatly intensified development programmes in both the NWFP and Baluchistan during the 1970s.²⁸

As one would expect, tribesmen are poorly represented in management of the modest modern sector of economic enterprise in the tribal areas of Baluchistan and the NWFP. What manufacturing industry exists is concentrated almost entirely in the provincial capitals of Quetta and Peshawar.²⁹ In both, outsiders exercise disproportionate influence. The situation is most extreme in Quetta, the only city of any size in Baluchistan, where Baluchis are a very small minority of the city's population and where manufacturing and commerce are almost entirely monopolized by non-Baluchis. The province of Baluchistan produces the bulk of Pakistan's natural gas and is the site of numerous coal and other mining operations; but Baluchis have little control over these industries.³⁰

There is no question that some members of tribal society welcome the changes which accompany economic development of their areas. In my discussions with tribal leaders in 1979, most were emphatic in their support of economic development programmes. Ordinary tribesmen appear similarly inclined. One longtime observer of the Baluchis has recorded her amazement at the rapidity of 'de-tribalization' among tribesmen employed in the Sui gas fields in Bugti tribal area. Within a short time after employment, many had become lathe operators, truck drivers, clerks and mechanics. Some had cut short their hair, and were dressing in European-style

garments, eating tinned foodstuffs, and, in some cases, learning to speak Urdu and English. Almost overnight, their aspirations – and possibly their loyalties – appeared to have shifted very fundamentally.³¹

Of course, the changes are not universally welcomed or their benefits evenly distributed. For some tribal leaders, especially those with strong political ambitions, economic integration means above all else the erosion of their authority. This may be the motive behind the efforts of some Baluch and Pathan leaders, for instance, to impede the construction of roads in tribal areas.³² Such obstructionism should not be seen as having obscurantist motives, however, since virtually all the Baluch leaders make it clear that they welcome economic development – once political autonomy is acquired.

For others, the arrival of government controls is a threat to economic livelihood. In 1979, the Pathan, Baluch, and Kurdish tribal areas of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan together reportedly produced three times as much opium as was produced that year in Southeast Asia's notorious Golden Triangle.³³ The governments of Ayatollah Khomeini and President Zia ul-Haq responded with massive crackdowns on the production and consumption of narcotics; but the tribal areas are yet sufficiently free of effective central controls to make enforcement of a ban on this enormously lucrative enterprise virtually impossible.

Whether welcomed or not, economic integration appears to be highly destructive of traditional tribal relationships. Among Pathans, politically and economically prominent landholders (khans) are traditionally obligated to be selfless in regard to the accumulation of wealth and to display unstinting generosity towards their followers. The monetary rewards of urban markets now offer an alternative way to obtain status, and many of the khans apparently no longer live up to expectations. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, according to the anthropologist Jon Anderson, the acquisition of expensive agricultural technology, especially tractors, by khans of the Ghilzai Pathan tribe of eastern Afghanistan both mirrored and accentuated the trend toward more competitive economic relationships. The tractors facilitated the individual accumulation of wealth; hence, patronage of traditional tribal clients declined as a means for the maintenance of status.³⁴

Among Pakistan's Swat Pathans, the same basic process contributed in the 1970s to the growth of severe class conflict between patron landlords and their disgruntled tenants. The increasingly monetized economy, according to Charles Lindholm, had already isolated the landholders from their traditional clients. When land reforms promulgated by the Bhutto government threatened to strengthen the tenants at the expense of the khans, enmity deepened and in some places erupted in violence.³⁵

PART II: GOVERNMENTS AND TRIBESMEN IN CONFL

PAKISTAN

Introduction

A recent and perceptive study by Shahid Javed Burki asserts that Pakistan's contemporary political and economic weakness is due primarily to the fact that Pakistani society was 'born polarized'.³⁶ Partition, he says, resulted in a huge influx of some eight million migrant refugees from India (*mohajirs*). By the time of the 1951 census, they accounted for nearly 25% of the population of what is now Pakistan, and for over 46% of the population of its 19 largest cities (over 57% of Karachi, then its capital). They were mostly urbanized and Urdu speaking, and they brought with them a cultural outlook totally at variance with that of the indigenous rural society to which they had come. Having spearheaded the Pakistan Movement in India, they took command of the new Pakistan's economic, social, and political institutions. These they shaped to fit their own aspirations, thereby fundamentally threatening traditional landed interests and laying the groundwork for subsequent group rivalries.

Divided thus into 'insiders' and 'outsiders', Pakistan at the very outset was crippled in its efforts to unify and establish stable

institutions under already difficult conditions of ethnic pluralism, extreme social inequality, and geographic separation of its two component parts. It was not, according to Burki, that Pakistan's leadership lacked political experience or that its people were short on economic resourcefulness that accounts for its ongoing constitutional and institutional crises, but rather that the alignment of interests fostered by Partition was basically not amenable to accommodation – at least not within the framework of Western-style democracy.³⁷

Whatever the cause, the plain fact is that after a brief flirtation with parliamentary democracy in the early 1950s, Pakistan succumbed to an authoritarian malaise from which it has never recovered. Since independence in 1947, there have been five constitutions drafted, of which three were adopted (1956, 1962, 1973). There have been three periods of martial law (1958–1962, 1969–1971, 1977–). Pakistan has fought three wars with India (not at all unrelated to its perplexed domestic situation), in the last of which (1971) it suffered a stunning military defeat, the loss of East Pakistan Province and over half of the country's population. All of these developments, combined with a profound sense of insecurity in regard to the intentions of its neighbours and the permanence of its peoples' commitment to the idea of Pakistan, have left a deep imprint on the government's relationship with the tribal groups of the western borderlands and on its capacity to peacefully resolve its differences with them.

Government Policies Towards the Tribal Areas

The system developed by the British for governing the NWFP and Baluchistan had three basic territorial components: (1) the semi-autonomous princely states; (2) the centrally-administered territories (the Tribal Agencies of the Northwest Frontier, and the chief commissioner's province of Baluchistan); and (3) the locally-administered settled districts (the governor's province of the Northwest Frontier).

Since independence, all of the princely states (four in Baluchistan, four in the Northwest Frontier) have been abolished as such and (by 1970) brought fully under provincial administration. The centrally-administered territories of Baluchistan are now formally under provincial administration; those of the Northwest Frontier remain primarily under central administration, although certain parts have been brought under regular provincial administration over the years. As of 1972, there were a total of 14 specially designated tribal areas in Pakistan – ten (the Centrally Administered Tribal Areas, listed earlier) in the Northwest Frontier, three in Baluchistan (Bugti, Marri, and Kachhi), and one (Dera Ghazi Khan) in the district of Punjab which adjoins Baluchistan.

Concerned largely with frontier security, the British ruled the Tribal Agencies and most of the province of Baluchistan through Political Agents entrusted mainly with security and peace-keeping functions. Customary tribal law was retained, enforced by tribal councils (*jirgas*) under the so-called Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR).

In somewhat abridged form, the FCR continues in practice today. Central and provincial laws generally do not apply in any of the tribal areas, although they may be (and in some cases have been) extended to them at the discretion of the central government.

Administratively, there was thus a good deal of structural and procedural carry-over in government tribal policy from the British period into independent Pakistan. Indeed, in certain respects British policy has proven extraordinarily tenacious. This is especially apparent in the pattern of recruitment to Pakistan's armed forces.

The British idea that certain of India's ethnic groups possessed more masculine or martial qualities than others contributed to a highly imbalanced military recruitment policy. Punjabi Muslims, the single largest group in the British Indian Army at the time of independence, were the chief beneficiaries of the policy. But Pathans from the NWFP were also especially heavily represented. The government of Pakistan has always been reluctant to release detailed data on the ethnic composition of either the enlisted or officer grades; but available evidence strongly suggests that the tradition of 'martial races' is alive and well and that the Pathans continue to benefit from it at least as much as the Punjabis.

In a recent analysis of the Pakistan military, Stephen Cohen states that percentages of ethnic recruitment since independence have not

changed dramatically from what they were under the British during World War II. From the areas that later became Pakistan, British recruitment then, according to the figures given by Cohen, was 77% from the Punjab, 49.5% from NWFP, 2.2% from Sind, and about .06% from Baluchistan.³⁸ Of the 24 generals in the Pakistan army in June 1959, according to another author, 11 were Pathans and 11 were Punjabis.³⁹ So dominant had Pathans become in the country's military establishment by the time Bhutto came to power in the 1970s, in the judgment of the distinguished scholar Shahid Javed Burki, that Bhutto, apparently concerned lest their ethno-regional identity interfere with their loyalty to him, launched a major reorganization of the officer staff.⁴⁰

While there is no question that many Pathans have risen to prominence through the military, it is easy to exaggerate the collective benefit for Pathans as a whole of the military recruitment policy. One reason is that the number of districts from which military recruits have generally come is astonishingly limited. Three districts in the Punjab (Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Campbellpur) and only two (settled) districts in the NWFP (Kohat, Mardan) account for 75% of all ex-servicemen.⁴¹ Hence, most of the NWFP, including the Tribal Agencies, is in fact poorly represented in the military. Another reason is that military socialization, while it may not succeed in instilling a national outlook in every Pathan recruit, unquestionably contributes to the dilution of tribal culture. Ayub Khan was a Tarin Pathan, no doubt. But he was raised in a non-Pashto-speaking district (Hazara) of the NWFP, and was educated in a tradition utterly remote from that of his nominal kinsmen. If his ten-year rule constituted a 'Pathan Raj', we should understand it to have been one of detribalized Pathans only.

To say this is not to scorn the Pathan achievement – or to discount entirely the advantages which Pathans may derive as a group from the prominence of Pathan individuals in the military. In a country so often ruled by the military, such a position would clearly be unreasonable. One need only contrast their situation with that of the Baluchis to sense the potential long-term political importance to the Pathans of a highly selective military recruitment policy.

The British classed Baluchis among the martial races. However, perhaps because Baluch tribesmen proved less adaptable to military life than Pathans, they were recruited to the military in very small numbers. As suggested above, that apparently continues to be the situation at present. There is absolutely no likelihood that a 'Baluch Raj' will grow out of Pakistan's military establishment.

Minimal representation in the military, we might add, is only one aspect of Baluch political weakness in Pakistan. They have been just as poorly represented in the bureaucracy. Very few Baluchis have ever held key positions in the central government of Pakistan, from which they could effectively influence the process of change in the Baluch homeland. Only four of the 179 persons who were named to central cabinets in Pakistan from 1947 to 1977 were ethnic Baluchis, according to a recent study, and only one of them (Aktar Bugti) was named prior to the 1970s.⁴² Even within the province, Baluchis had been almost entirely excluded from decision-making positions until the early 1970s. According to one estimate, of the roughly 40,000 civil employees of all kinds in Baluchistan in 1972 (at the beginning of the Bhutto period), only about 2,000 (5%) were Baluchis, and most of them reportedly held inferior jobs.⁴³ Thereafter, a brief period of provincial self-government set in motion a trend toward increased local tribal recruitment to official positions.

There is some irony in the fact that Baluchis have fared better in neighbouring Punjab in this respect than in Baluchistan. In the last Punjab provincial cabinet during the Bhutto era, according to one informant, three of the twelve cabinet ministers were of Baluch descent. Related to the 15th to 18th century Baluch conquests noted earlier in this report, ethnic Baluch achievements of this sort are probably of little material benefit to tribal co-ethnics in Baluchistan.

British policy toward the tribal areas clearly left an imprint on contemporary Pakistan. Basically, however, the new government has pursued a very different path than did the British, necessarily so, perhaps, since it viewed the borderlands as integral components of the new state and not merely as frontier buffers. While consistency of tribal policy has certainly not been a characteristic of the thirty-odd years of independence, the fundamental trend has clearly been the acceleration and intensification of pressures for integrating the tribal areas more completely into the country's political, social and

economic mainstream. The slow but seemingly inexorable gathering of these centripetal forces is apparent in the development of events since 1947.

A. The Early Post-Independence Period (1947-1957)

For almost a decade after independence, the government pursued a policy towards the tribal areas best described as one of 'benign neglect'. It maintained a very low military profile, abandoning some cantonments and allowing roads to deteriorate in many areas. Indeed, government control of parts of the Pathan tribal areas, according to James Spain, probably declined in this period.⁴⁴ Economic expenditures steadily increased, but major efforts at economic development were noticeably absent virtually everywhere in the tribal belt.

The central government did not shy away entirely from the use of armed force during these early years in its efforts to establish government authority in tribal areas. In the spring of 1948, for example, it resorted to military force to compel the accession to Pakistan of Kalat State, whose ruler, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, had set about to secure independence.⁴⁵ But government use of coercion in this case was mitigated by its action a few years thereafter in constituting the Baluchistan States Union (1952-1955), which provided the princes substantial autonomy and postponed their final day of reckoning. While the tribal areas thus had very little economic progress to boast of in this period, that fact has to be balanced against the considerable political autonomy which they did enjoy.

B. The Ayub Khan Period (1958-1969)

In contrast to the early post-independence period, in which laissez faire policies predominated, the long Ayub Khan era which followed it was marked by a powerful assertion of central authority in virtually all aspects of its relationship with tribal areas. The process was already underway by 1955, with the announcement of the One Unit scheme (amalgamation of West Pakistan into one province). It was given added impetus with the final collapse of parliamentary institutions and the implementation of martial law under Field Marshall Ayub Khan in 1958. Ayub vastly increased the powers of the military, including stepped up garrisoning in tribal areas; promulgated a new and much more authoritarian constitution (1962); created a centrally-patronized network of local representative institutions (Basic Democracy) throughout Pakistan; promoted a variety of development programmes in tribal areas; and gave unflinching support to the steadily increasing authority of the central bureaucracy implicit in the One Unit provincial system.

The One Unit Controversy

The plan advanced in the mid-1950s for consolidating the various entities of West Pakistan into one province was basically a remedy for the constitutional stalemate then threatening the unity of Pakistan's two wings. The formation of One Unit was a device intended to hinder East Pakistan (Bengali) manipulation of inter-ethnic rivalries in the West and thereby to help increase acceptance of constitutional parity between the two wings in the National Assembly. As a byproduct, it was hoped the scheme would also help assure more equitable and efficient administration. As things turned out, the plan's principal accomplishment in the West was to lend legitimacy to the varied grievances of the minority ethno-linguistic groups (Sindhis, Pathans, Baluchis) against the majority Punjabis, while contributing little or nothing to interwing amity.

As part of the compromise worked out in winning broad acceptance of One Unit in West Pakistan, the numerically preponderant Punjabis had acquiesced to a representational formula in the National Assembly biased against themselves. But this well-intentioned political concession (which was withdrawn in 1967) was rendered meaningless by the authoritarianism inflicted on the country by Ayub Khan for over a decade beginning with the declaration of Martial Law in 1958. From then until its dissolution immediately after Ayub's fall from power in 1969, One Unit was a convenient focus for minority grievances of all kinds stemming from alleged Punjabi domination of government.

The government was accused, among other things, of aggravating already large regional economic inequalities by awarding the Punjab a disproportionate share of public funds for education,

health and other development projects; of causing rifts among non-Punjabis by favouring certain communities in areas outside the Punjab; and for forcing Punjabi culture on the country.⁴⁶

Opposition to One Unit was strong among both Pathans and Baluchis, but agitation against it took especially violent forms in Baluchistan. There, for over a year in the late 1960s, a situation which at times bordered on open rebellion persisted between the large Bugti tribe, living in Sibi district, and the central government.

Bugti antagonism had been aroused by what the tribesmen felt to be the government's politically motivated method of distributing scarce and extremely valuable barrage (irrigated) land in the area. In late August 1967, Bugti tribesmen showed their displeasure by opening a major breach in the Pat Feeder Canal of Guddu Barrage, sending irrigation waters careening over a rival tribe's lands and causing serious problems for the government. Armed forces were sent in to curb the spread of lawlessness, and in May 1968 Akbar Khan Bugti, the powerful sardar of the Bugti tribe, was detained under the Defence of Pakistan Rules. The affair was finally settled in November 1969, but not until there had been numerous armed clashes, aerial bombings, and severe casualties suffered on both sides.⁴⁷

C. The Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Period (1971-1977)

Under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the centralizing tendency grew more apparent than ever. In spite of the fact that the provinces had been reconstituted in 1970 and their continued autonomy explicitly guaranteed in the constitution he promulgated in 1973, Bhutto used the resources of the state more than any of his predecessors to subordinate the provinces to central authority. Under him, yet greater constitutional powers were provided to the central executive; and overhaul of the country's political, economic and administrative institutions was carried out with ruthless dedication to central control. There were few restraints observed in the treatment of political opponents. Repression fell most heavily upon the tribal areas.

Constitutional Protection of Tribal Rights

The loss of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971 removed some of the problems which had earlier bedevilled Pakistan's search for a constitutional order. Gone were both the peculiar division of territory into two wings and the asymmetrical division of the country's wealth and resources between them. Gone also was the large Hindu minority of the eastern province. There was now a single territory to be dealt with, with a population which was culturally more cohesive and almost wholly Islamic in faith.

The 1973 constitution was drafted by a multi-party parliamentary committee (including members of the political opposition) chosen from the National Assembly elected in 1970. While certainly more 'democratically' authored than was Ayub Khan's in the early 1960s, it was stamped indelibly with Mr. Bhutto's political philosophy.

The constitution endorses the federal administrative structure restored in 1969. It contains numerous guarantees of the rights of ethnic minorities. Among these is a provision protecting the right of groups to preserve and promote a distinct language, script or culture (Art. 28). Other provisions discourage parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices (Art. 33); commit the state to eradicate economic and social inequality among regions (Art. 37); require that people from all parts of the country be enabled to participate in the armed forces (Art. 39); and acknowledge the right of provincial assemblies to adopt measures for the teaching, promotion and use of a provincial language in addition to Urdu, the national language (Art. 251). The constitution reaffirms the separate legal status of the tribal areas under the Frontier Crimes Regulations (Art. 247).

Basically, however, the constitution of 1973 strengthens the power of the prime minister far more than it protects the rights of tribal or other minorities. Provincial autonomy is granted in principle; but there is no devolution of power.⁴⁸ A National Assembly is authorized, with an upper house whose delegates are drawn in equal numbers from the four provinces. But for a period of ten years from the adoption of the constitution, the possibility of a vote of no confidence is virtually eliminated by a special provision (Art. 96/5).

The constitution's initial authoritarian tendencies were gradually augmented, moreover, by legislative enactments further abridging fundamental rights and strengthening the emergency powers of the central government. Such, for example, was the effect of the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act of 1976, which drastically curtailed whatever remained of judicial restraint upon the government's use of preventive detention to hound the political opposition.⁴⁹ In practice, at least, Bhutto's constitution proved to be less a limit upon than an extension of his authoritarian regime.

Insurrection in Baluchistan

Between 1973 and 1977, eastern Baluchistan was swept by a major tribal rebellion against the government of Pakistan. It involved large elements of both the Baluch and Brahui groups. As many as 55,000 tribesmen, the Mengals and Marris most prominent among them, were engaged in the struggle by 1974. They were arrayed against a government force of perhaps 70,000 troops equipped with some of the most sophisticated and lethal weapons of modern warfare. Casualties were high on both sides: Selig Harrison estimates that at least 5,000 insurgents and over 3,000 government troops lost their lives in hundreds of bloody engagements.⁵⁰ In the course of the conflict, large quantities of livestock are said to have been destroyed, and the normal flow of food supplies to insurgent-controlled tribal areas in the province interrupted, resulting in considerable suffering among the civilian population as well.

The government of Pakistan maintained that the conflict had been provoked by a small clique of tribal chiefs (sardars) determined to 'stifle any form of socio-economic change that might erode their absolute feudal authority'.⁵¹ The tribal chiefs contended, and many scholars agree, that the insurrection originated largely in Mr. Bhutto's utter intolerance of the limits to his authority symbolized by the more autonomy-minded chiefs.⁵² Not an archaic system of tribal government, they said, but a power-hungry leader's rejection of the results of a free and fair election, was responsible for the bloodshed.

When Bhutto took over as President of Pakistan on 20 December 1971, his party, the Peoples Party of Pakistan (PPP), was securely in control of the Punjab and Sind, but it had very little support in either the NWFP or Baluchistan. In the General Elections of 1970, the PPP had won only a single seat in the National Assembly from the NWFP, where it polled less than 15% of the popular vote, and none at all from Baluchistan, where its share of the popular vote was a meagre 2%. It had done just as poorly in the provincial assemblies, having captured only 4 of 40 seats in the NWFP and none of the 20 seats in Baluchistan. Among the many opposition parties, the National Awami Party (NAP) emerged in the strongest position, having won 3 seats in the National Assembly from each of the two border provinces, and 8 and 13 seats, respectively, in the provincial legislatures of Baluchistan and the NWFP. The NAP, whose President was Khan Abdul Wali Khan, the son of the veteran Khan nationalist Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was at this time basically a regionalist alliance of Baluchis and Pathans. Founded in 1957, it was in some measure the ideological descendant of the *Khudai-Kidmatgars*.

On 25 December 1971, within days of assuming the Presidency, Bhutto attempted to override the results of the elections by appointing one of his own supporters, Ghaus Bakhsh Raisani, to be Governor of Baluchistan. Under pressure, however, Bhutto eventually relented and agreed to let NAP, in coalition with the religious-based and ultra-conservative Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), form governments in both of the border provinces. The decision was formalized in the so-called Tripartite Agreement of 6 March 1972;⁵³ and on 27 April, the NAP-JUI leaders assumed the reins of government in the two provinces. Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal, both powerful and respected leaders of Brahui tribes, became Governor and Chief Minister, respectively, in Baluchistan, and Arbab Sikander and Maulana Musfi Mahmud occupied the same positions in the NWFP.

This accommodative formula lasted less than ten months, until mid-February 1973, when Bhutto replaced both Governors, dismissed the government of Baluchistan, and the government in NWFP resigned in protest. Bhutto justified his action on the grounds that the NAP-JUI government had allowed – indeed, had patronized and encouraged – the spread of lawlessness and violence throughout the province, and that its goal, in concert with foreign anti-Pakistan forces, was no less than to bring about the country's dismemberment.

Specifically, Bhutto accused the NAP leaders in Baluchistan of surreptitiously arming their tribal allies with weapons lifted from government stocks; of trafficking in illicit food and weapons and of brazenly obstructing Federal efforts to curtail the smuggling of weapons into Pakistan from abroad; of interfering with the government's attempts to bring modernization to the province in the form of roads, schools, dispensaries, and so on; of undermining government law enforcement agencies in the province; and of failure to stem a rising tide of tribal depredations against innocent people.⁵⁴

One need not exonerate the NAP leaders either of complicity in at least some of these activities or of ruthless political ambitions of their own to suspect the central government of a one-sided interpretation of events. But in gaining a major foothold for provincial autonomy, they had already wrung a significant concession from Bhutto; it seems unlikely that they would have so quickly and so clumsily risked destroying it. The central government's evidence of seditious behaviour and intrigue with foreign forces on the part of NAP leaders, at least what was brought out in the government's case for the dissolution of NAP, heard before the Supreme Court in June 1975, was almost entirely circumstantial.⁵⁵ If tribal leaders are to be believed, Bhutto was himself directly responsible for many of the illicit and violent activities – including extensive arms smuggling into Baluchistan – for which they stood accused.

Following several incidents of tribal violence in late 1972 (see Appendix for Chronology), and the discovery of a large cache of Soviet weapons in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad on 10 February 1973 (which the government maintained was intended for secessionist forces in Baluchistan), Bhutto abruptly ended the brief experiment in provincial self-rule. He appointed Akbar Khan Bugti, the sardar of the large Bugti tribe and arch-rival of the NAP leaders, as Governor. Bugti, however, proved an unwieldy instrument of Bhutto's will and was forced to resign in less than a year. For some time, Bhutto sought to retain the appearance of self-government in the province; but as the insurgency spread, accommodation of tribal interests gave way almost entirely to repression.

Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Ataullah Khan Mengal, as well as NAP president in Baluchistan, Khair Bakhsh Marri, were arrested. Pathan NAP leaders continued to function freely until a series of violent incidents in the NWFP, culminating in the assassination in Peshawar in February 1975 of Hayat Khan Sherpao, PPP leader and provincial Home Minister in NWFP, brought the arrests of Wali Khan and other key NAP leaders and the banning of the party. In April 1976, Bhutto announced the abolition of the sardari system in a speech in Quetta. It was not the first time Pakistani leaders had sought to cripple the sardars in this way: in the midst of the One Unit controversy in the 1960s, Ayub Khan had withdrawn sardari privileges from the politically unruly chiefs of the Marri, Bugti and Mengal tribes.⁵⁶

The government claimed that many tribal rebels had surrendered under terms of amnesty granted by Mr. Bhutto; but several thousands are known to have fled to neighbouring Afghanistan where they obtained sanctuary and where many remain in government camps today.⁵⁷ In spite of Bhutto's premature announcement (October 1974) of the end of the insurgency, it dragged on fitfully until his government fell in the summer of 1977. The Martial Law administration released the NAP leaders from prison at the end of the year and all hostilities ceased.

D. The Zia ul-Haq Period (1977-)

The martial law regime of General (President) Zia ul-Haq applied a brake to many aspects of the centralizing trend. Zia appeared content, at least for the first three years of his rule, to maintain an uneasy truce with the tribal areas. There was no reason, however, to expect his government (or its successors) to reverse the general trend. External forces aggravating the country's deep sense of insecurity loomed larger than ever. And nothing like an economic or political equilibrium had been achieved internally.

In the course of 1979, Ataullah Khan Mengal and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo founded a successor to NAP called the Pakistan National Party. Its programme urged that Pakistan be recognized as consisting of four separate and equal nationalities, each of which should have maximum autonomy within its own province. Only four subjects (defence, foreign affairs, currency and communications) were to be left to the central government, and even these were

to be administered by an agency in which all four nationalities were equally represented.⁵⁸

Between these aspirations and the current political reality there is a wide gap. At the time of writing, all political activity has been banned in Pakistan and many political leaders have been arrested under preventive detention rules. Late in 1979, a military tribunal sentenced a well-known Pakistani journalist to one year imprisonment for reporting unrest and disaffection in Baluchistan.⁵⁹

Although the present situation is much too confused to permit inflexible predictions, the greatest likelihood in the foreseeable future is that there will be more rather than less effort to firmly establish central authority in tribal areas. On the other hand, as unlikely as political decentralization continues to be in the context of contemporary Pakistan, no less unlikely is the weakening of tribal demands for greater autonomy and equality.

IRAN

Spread thinly over the remote and arid southeastern part of Iran, the 500,000-750,000 Baluchis of Iranian Baluchistan represent a very small fragment (less than 2%) of the country's population, estimated in 1979 at 36 million.⁶⁰ Most of them dwell within the province of Baluchistan and Seistan (1966 population = 503,845), whose eastern boundary is the 590-mile long Goldsmid Line separating Iran from Pakistan; but there are considerable numbers in portions of neighbouring Kerman and Khorasan provinces. The Baluchis have been on the periphery of all the major socio-economic and political developments which have transformed Iran in the 20th century. But while they have had little direct role in shaping events, they have unquestionably been radically affected by their consequences.

Iranian Baluchistan's relative isolation was first seriously disturbed in modern times by the British, whose influence in the area spread from India in the last half of the 19th century. Britain's paramount concern for the region's security was formalized in August 1907 by the Anglo-Russian Convention of St. Petersburg, which recognized a British sphere of interest in the territory reaching from the Afghan frontier to Bandar Abbas on the Straits of Hormuz. During World War I, British-officered forces were deployed in this area; but until a coup d'état brought the determined Persian nationalist Reza Khan to power in 1921, the Baluch homeland remained relatively autonomous, run largely by local hereditary chiefs who had little difficulty fending off the failing Qajar dynasty's feeble efforts to control them.

For Reza Khan, whose vision of statecraft later found some inspiration in European fascism, the existence of autonomous and lawless tribals, contemptuous of Teheran and free to plunder caravans and to raid upon settled villages, was intolerable. The tribesmen, like everyone else, had to be disciplined and made productive members of Iranian society if Iran was to be successful in gaining release from the grip of European imperialist powers. As Minister of War and the most effective leader in the government of the last of the Qajars, Ahmad Shah (1909-1925), Reza Khan launched a series of pacification campaigns to restore central authority in the tribal areas, and by the time of his accession to the Peacock Throne and founding of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925 he had made considerable headway.⁶¹

Systematic pacification of Baluch tribes was begun in 1928. Raiding was terminated, tribal forces broken up, weapons confiscated, and civil and military administration imposed. Young men were conscripted into the army. Offending chiefs were executed or exiled. Nomadic tribesmen were encouraged, in some cases forced, to settle in agricultural villages. New roads and railroads helped to link them with the wider market economy. By 1935, the power of the tribal chieftains to defy the State had been crushed in all parts of Baluchistan - much earlier and more successfully than in Pakistan. At no time since then have the Iranian Baluchis posed a serious threat to the central authorities.⁶²

With the Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran in 1941 and the subsequent forced abdication of the Nazi-sympathizing Reza Shah, Teheran's control of Baluchistan was temporarily interrupted. But it was not long before central authority reasserted itself. The lessons of the immediate post-World War II period, when Kurdish and Azerbaijani autonomous republics were declared in the Soviet-

occupied zone of northern Iran, were not lost on the second of the Pahlavis - Mohammad Reza Shah. Like his father, the new Shah recognized very early the enormous strategic importance to Iran's territorial integrity of the country's immense tribal population, including the Baluchis.

Under Mohammad Reza Shah, central authority manifested itself in Baluchistan mainly in the form of a watchful military and administrative machinery tightly controlled from Teheran. These were augmented to some extent, particularly after 1963 with implementation of what the monarch hailed as a White Revolution, by attempts to introduce social, economic and political reforms. The centrepiece of the White Revolution was the breakup of large estates and the distribution of land to poor peasants; but vast human and material resources were also to be poured into female emancipation, literacy, health and other social welfare and development programmes.⁶³

By the end of the 1960s, according to Salzman, a variety of development programmes were underway in Iranian Baluchistan; and plans had been laid for improved roads, marketing of handicrafts, irrigation projects, as well as for additional educational, health and veterinary services.⁶⁴ The construction of a huge air and naval base at Chah Bahar on the Baluchistan coast, begun in the 1970s, was also expected to contribute to development of the province. By the time of the Shah's fall from power, however, the promises of the White Revolution - at least in so far as Baluchistan was concerned - remained largely on paper. No signs had appeared, moreover, that the monarchy was interested in encouraging greater cultural or political self-expression among the Baluchis, even of the limited sort long accepted in Pakistan. On the contrary, in the 1970s Teheran's response to upheavals on the other side of the border was to repress the Baluch language, dress or any other expression of Baluch identity even more vigorously than before.⁶⁵

Like his father, Mohammad Reza Shah was forced to give up the throne long before he had accomplished his declared objectives. But, in contrast to his father, when the last of the Pahlavis went into exile on 15 January 1979, he left behind a revolutionary and as yet unresolved situation.

Impact of the Islamic Revolution

Temporarily, at least, Iran's government has come into the hands of fundamentalist Shi'ite clerics, the long-exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini foremost among them, who had been excluded from power during the Pahlavi era and whose social prestige had been eroded by the Shah's forced march into modernization. They declared Iran an Islamic Republic on 1 April 1979, then promulgated a constitution giving both the Ayatollah and the Shi'ite sect of Islam prominent place and reaffirming the unitary basis of the State.

For a number of reasons, Iran's Islamic revolution was bound to cause stirrings of discontent among Baluchis, as well as among other ethnic and tribal minorities. First of all, for decades Baluchis had been among the beneficiaries of the Pahlavi government's patronage. Economic resources had been used extensively to assure the tribesmen's loyalty and submission to Teheran; and the authority of tribal leaders had become directly dependent upon the continuity of programmes through which these resources were made locally available. The potential threat to this clientelist relationship stemming from the new regime's anti-reformist inclinations, as well as from the inevitable replacement of local and provincial bureaucratic officials, must have had an upsetting effect on Baluch leaders.

Second, the Baluchis were likely to be apprehensive of the regime's religious orthodoxy, which threatened to take forms offensive to the Baluchis' Sunni faith. Ironically, it was the essentially secular Pahlavi regime which had earlier this century provoked religious revivalism among the Baluchis, who, in Iran as in Pakistan, had previously given little attention to religious matters.⁶⁶ The Khomeini government's sectarian chauvinism seemed bound to invest the Baluchis' Sunni sectarianism with the same anti-State symbolism as was inspired by the Pahlavis' ruthless pacification campaigns.

Third, the new constitution erected a framework of government no less unitary than that of the Pahlavis, and promised no more autonomy or self-government to the tribal areas. At the time of the Shah's overthrow, Iran was administratively divided into 23 provinces (*ostans*), each governed by royally-appointed Governors-

General. Provincial boundaries mirrored administrative requirements rather than ethno-linguistic realities; Baluchistan, for example, had expanded in 1959 to embrace mainly non-Baluch Seistan. Provincial councils (*anjumans*) were established in 1968; but Baluchistan has never known a directly-elected provincial legislature of the sort which flourished (briefly) among the Baluchis in neighbouring Pakistan. Nor does the qualified federalism of Pakistan seem any more likely now in Iran than it was under the Shah. In summer 1980, the government of Ayatollah Khomeini, conforming to past practice, appointed a non-Baluch Shi'ite Muslim as Governor of the Sunni Baluch-majority province of Baluchistan and Seistan.

In late December 1979, Baluch resentment against the Khomeini regime flared up into severe disturbances in the provincial capital of Zahidan and its vicinity, involving Baluchis, the more affluent Seistanis, and revolutionary guards. There were at least 11 deaths and several score wounded in three days of fighting. On 22 December, martial law was clamped on the province. Tribal ambushes of military vehicles south of Zahidan were reported in early January.⁶⁷

AFGHANISTAN

Since the conquest of the Persian Safavids and founding of the indigenous Durrani dynasty in Kabul in 1747, Pashtuns (Pathans) have been the dominant element in Afghan society. But with the exception of the first fifty years or so of their rule, during which the Durrani Empire reached from the Oxus River to the Arabian Sea and from Delhi to the heart of Persia, embracing virtually all of modern Pakistan (including Baluchistan), theirs has been a story of almost unending internal turmoil and of repeated external efforts to control or destroy them. The tribal rebellion which took shape as the Movement of Islamic Revolution following the Marxist coup of April 1978 was merely the latest of countless struggles – between nomadic and settled tribes, between (western) Durrani and (eastern) Ghilzai Pashtuns, and between Pashtuns and the Tajiks, Uzbeks or other peoples to the north of the Hindu Kush – to have bled Afghanistan from within over the past two centuries. And the Soviet military intervention launched in December 1979 followed upon a century and a half of struggle involving, among other contenders, the Russian czars and their Soviet successors, and the British Empire and the United States, to bring Afghanistan within the orbit of this or that foreign power.

The Durand Line, the product of a treaty concluded between the Afghans and British in 1893, formalized not only the loss of Baluchistan but the partitioning, roughly in half, of the Pashtuns. However, since the independent hill tribes who straddled the official boundary paid little attention to it, they continued to play an important role in the political struggles waged on both sides of the Line – a tradition which they were still upholding in 1980. In fact, in Afghanistan, which, in sharp contrast to either Iran or Pakistan, is basically still a tribal society, the loyalty of the tribesmen has been indispensable to the successful exercise of political power. For example, King Amanullah (1919-1929), inspired by his grand tour of Europe (which included Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's secular Turkish republic) in 1928, returned to Afghanistan determined to force its rapid modernization. His reforms, which included the unveiling of women, had hardly been announced, however, when the unappreciative Pashtun tribesmen drove him from the country.⁶⁸ The trio of Marxist Pashtuns (Nur Mohammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal), who sought one after another since 1978 to redirect their countrymen's energies to the task of socialist reconstruction, all encountered a similarly hostile response from large parts of tribal society.

Following the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919, Afghanistan succeeded in persuading the British to relinquish control over Afghan foreign policy. For the next sixty years, until the Soviet invasion of 1979, Afghanistan remained politically independent and neutral (in World War II and as a member of the non-aligned movement in the post-World War II period). At the same time, it underwent profound, even if at times subtle, socio-economic change. This became especially pronounced after 1953, with the designation of Prince Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan as Prime Minister and the acceleration of external – especially Soviet –

economic assistance. Throughout this period, its 'tribal problem' remained uppermost in Afghanistan's internal and external affairs.

Afghanistan's contemporary tribal problem has several dimensions. The Pashtuns, who are the single largest group in the country and probably half or so of its population, themselves contain many diverse and often conflicting elements. Most are sedentary or semi-sedentary farmers. Perhaps 2.5 million of them are nomads, perhaps the largest remaining nomadic population in the world. Others belong to the small but influential Persian-speaking, urban middle class of largely detribalized professionals, businessmen and bureaucrats. The tribal population is divided into a bewildering assembly of tribes, clans (*khels*) and other subdivisions. To a large extent, the internal politics of Afghanistan is the intra-tribal politics of the Pashtuns. Discussion of it would far exceed our purposes in this report.

Afghanistan's tribal groups virtually all overlap with neighbouring states; hence, its tribal problem is inherently an international one as well. We return to this aspect below in the discussion of the 'Pashtunistan' question.

Since the Pashtuns share the country with many other groups, we need here to look briefly at the manner in which Pashtuns have dealt with ethnic minorities, in particular the small Baluch population, in a land where they are the dominant community.

The Afghan Baluchis, being Sunni Muslims, are of the same religious community as the Pashtuns. Their language is, like Pashto, of Iranian origin. Their numbers are small (only 100,000, or less than 1% of the population, if Brahuis are excluded). And they occupy a sparsely-settled and little developed desert area along the southern frontier. In the past, all of these factors helped to shield them against active Pashtun discrimination. Though they possessed no particular cultural rights, basically they were left alone.⁶⁹

As Pashtun nationalist feelings have developed in the 20th century, so too has the tendency to foster a single Pashtun identity among all citizens of Afghanistan. In the past, this was accomplished, in part, through a policy of neglect (i.e., by withholding official recognition from all other groups except the Persian-speaking Tajiks – the country's second largest group – whose tongue is yet the true *lingua franca* of Afghanistan). There were also efforts actively to promote the Pashto language and culture. Schooling in Pashto was mandated in some non-Pashto areas, its literature was publicly subsidized, and in Article 35 of the 1964 constitution, Pashto was named the sole *national language* (with Dari, or Persian, it was also one of two *official languages*).⁷⁰

The pro-Soviet coup of 1978 brought a dramatic change at least in formal cultural policy. In contrast with Iran, where in 1979 the Islamic revolutionary regime of Ayatollah Khomeini rejected constitutional recognition both of ethnic minorities and of the Sunni religion, the new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, according to Eden Naby, adopted an unusually accommodative 'nationalities model' akin to that of the Soviet Union.⁷¹

In autumn 1978, only months following the April coup, four languages (Uzbek, Turkmen, Nuristani and, in spite of the limited number of speakers, Baluchi) were singled out for recognition in addition to Pashto and Dari as official languages of Afghanistan. Facilities for propagation were pledged, and steps were taken to implement the new policy in four areas – participation in government, education, publication of periodicals, and cultural expression. A Baluchi-language weekly began publication in September 1978. Beginning in September 1979, Baluchi-speaking first graders were presumably able to attend classes in their own language, if they so chose. And there were plans, according to Naby, to provide complete Baluchi-language schools in Baluchi-majority areas.⁷²

As of 1980, the Marxist regime was still heavily Pashtun; and there had been no move towards territorial decentralization: Afghanistan's 24 provinces were all still ruled from the centre through governors appointed by the Revolutionary Council. It was also clear (since groups larger than the Baluchis, such as the Brahuis or the Shi'ite Hazaras, were denied recognition) that the policy was motivated at least partially by regional strategic (and propaganda) considerations. Nonetheless, the Afghan Baluchis, one of that country's smallest minorities, had become – at least on paper – one of its most protected.

PART III: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

THE CONTEMPORARY 'GREAT GAME'

The area between the Hindu Kush Mountains and the Arabian Sea is the setting today for an intensified international power struggle worthy of the 'Great Game', the name coined in the 1800s for the ruthless and often deadly intrigue that characterized over a century of Anglo-Russian rivalry for control of Central Asia. In the contemporary version, there are new players, new weapons and new tactics, and the stakes, which now include control over the vast and incalculably important energy resources of the Persian Gulf, are probably of wider significance than ever before. But for the Baluchis and Pathans who inhabit the contested areas, and whose fortunes now as in the past are perilously dependent on the outcome of the struggle for its control, this new version of the 'Great Game' must have a familiar sound.

The frontier tribesmen have always been pivotal elements in the struggle. Efforts to pacify and control them occupied the British for many years in endless diplomatic wrangling and in a very costly succession of often fruitless military campaigns. By the end of the 19th century, they had subdued most of Baluchistan and had reduced Afghanistan, though not the border tribes, virtually to the status of a British dependency. But that did not last long. The Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 loosened Britain's grip; and from then until British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, an assortment of Turkish Pashas, Russian Bolsheviks, German Nazis and others competed with the British for influence in Kabul.⁷³

With Britain's departure from the area, the 'tribal problem' fell to the three governments under which the Baluchis and Pathans lived. Iran's tribal populations had been effectively pacified by the 1930s, and the new Shah appeared capable and willing to rule as firmly as his father. Pakistan inherited the bulk of the Baluch and Pathan tribals, including some elements which had never been successfully pacified. It counted on a common religion to bind them to the State. Afghanistan's boundaries enclosed an extraordinarily heterogeneous population, virtually every segment of which could claim ties with a large co-ethnic group in neighbouring Iran, Pakistan or the Soviet Union – a situation which the British had helped to create but were no longer present to police.

There were grounds for renewed tribal conflict within the tristate area itself. In all of the three countries the political loyalties of tribesmen were suspect. And there was Afghanistan's backing of a separate Pathan homeland, or 'Pashtunistan'. But from the very beginning, these underlying strains were made much more deadly by the threat and the reality of foreign interference in tribal affairs – by the renewal, that is, of the 'Great Game'.

Even before independence came, India's Hindu-majority Congress party had espoused the cause of Pathan nationalism; and on numerous occasions since then it has given Pakistan's tribal minorities at least favourable publicity and moral encouragement in their struggles with Islamabad. Material Indian assistance (to the rebellious Baluchis in the 1970s, for example) has been more often alleged than proven; but since India conceded Pakistan's separate existence in the first place only with the greatest loathing, it is no wonder that Pakistanis widely suspect Indians of conniving with the tribals over the country's future dismemberment.

In the early 1950s, the United States implemented its containment doctrine in Central Asia by joining the Northern Tier states of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan – but not Afghanistan – in a *cordon sanitaire* directed against the Soviet Union.⁷⁴ To Afghanistan, the only one of the four Northern Tier states excluded from the alliance system, the United States provided economic assistance alone. To the others, the United States supplied generous amounts of modern military equipment. With these acts, the United States planted the West's defensive frontier squarely in the middle of the Baluch and Pathan homelands, rendering the tribesmen literally frontline participants in the Cold War. What that meant in material terms was driven home to rebellious Baluchis in both the 1960s and 1970s, when Pakistan's armed forces used US-made weapons in the struggles against them.

The Soviet Union's emergence as a superpower in the aftermath of World War II raised fears in Afghanistan that its neighbour to the north might revive the aggressive foreign policy which it had

pursued south of the Oxus River in the 1920s.⁷⁵ The Soviet establishment of autonomous Kurdish and Azerbaijani governments in Iran's northwest in 1946 seemed to confirm Afghan apprehensions. Beginning in 1948, therefore, the Afghan government sent several delegations to Washington to confer in regard to military assistance and a defence guarantee against the threat of Soviet aggression. Whether Afghanistan actually intended to compromise its non-alignment is uncertain. In any event, the United States refused, partly on grounds that Afghanistan had very limited strategic value to the United States, but also because arming Afghanistan would have complicated America's relationship with Pakistan, Afghanistan's bitter regional rival.⁷⁶

Afghanistan's isolation supplied the Soviets with an opening. In 1953, with the naming as Prime Minister of King Zahir Shah's reform-minded and staunchly pro-Pashtunistan cousin, Prince Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan, Soviet economic assistance was launched. In 1955, the Soviet Union backed Afghanistan's demand for a plebiscite in the NWFP and Baluchistan that would have allowed free expression of the political will of the frontier tribesmen.⁷⁷ In 1956, an arms agreement was reached; and by 1957, the Soviet Union had become what it remains today – the almost exclusive source of Kabul's military equipment and training.⁷⁸ In these events lay the foundations of subsequent Soviet support of tribal separatist movements among both Baluchis and Pathans.

The tribesmen soon found themselves caught up in Cold War feuds having little to do with themselves. Iraq's dispute with Iran is instructive. Sorely pressed by the US-backed Shah of Iran's blatant support of Kurdish rebels in Iraq's northern mountains between 1968 and 1975, Iraq's Soviet-backed President Saddam Hussein countered by providing a haven for leaders of the pro-Soviet Baluchistan People's Liberation Front, which appeared around 1973, and by supporting the appeal for 'Greater Baluchistan' in Baluchi-language broadcasts over Radio Baghdad, and, allegedly, by supplying arms to Baluch guerrillas.⁷⁹

Iraq's provocative gesture towards Iran's southeast was a major concern of the Shah, who retaliated by assisting Bhutto in his campaign against the Baluch rebellion on the Pakistan side of the border. The Algiers Accord of 1975 between Iran and Iraq brought only temporary resolution of the problem. It was unilaterally abrogated by Iraq in autumn 1980, signalling the complete breakdown in Iran-Iraq relations which ended in open warfare in September of that year.

Iran's oft-voiced apprehension about the security of its eastern frontiers also took the form of efforts to moderate the dispute over 'Pashtunistan' between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 1975, Iran offered a \$2 billion aid package to Afghanistan, which included the opening up of an alternative land route for Afghan trade through Kerman province to Chah Bahar on Iran's Baluchistan coast.⁸⁰ Significantly, in the wake of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, the Iranian government of Ayatollah Khomeini appeared distressed at Iranian Baluch support of co-ethnic tribesmen fighting across the border in Afghanistan. In spite of its militant Islamic ideology and strident anti-Sovietism, the new Iranian government seemed as concerned as had been its predecessor to avoid provoking trouble along the country's lengthy and highly vulnerable eastern boundary.⁸¹

The Marxist Coup and Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

The Marxist take-over in Afghanistan in April 1978, followed by a massive increase in Soviet economic and military assistance and, less than two years later, by direct military intervention in December 1979, injected an entirely new element into the contemporary struggle for control of Central Asia. Half-forgotten images of the centuries-long czarist quest for a warm-water port aroused fears that the sovietization of Afghanistan had accomplished the first leg in the construction of a Soviet corridor to the sea. The principal question, it seemed, had become not whether the Kremlin planned the conquest of the second leg (Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan), but how.⁸² If the Soviet Red Army was preparing a frontal assault on the area between Afghanistan and the Arabian Sea, the presence of a few million tribesmen would hardly matter. If, on the other hand, the Soviets planned a more discreet strategy of subversion, then the tribesmen mattered a great deal.

In regard to the latter possibility, there was plenty of evidence to fuel speculation. The most popular leader in Baluchistan was the

Marxist-oriented Sardar Khair Bakhsh Marri, whose large and powerful Marri tribe had formed the backbone of the 1970s insurgency. Several thousand of his armed tribesmen were still in Afghanistan, having fled there in the mid-1970s, and presumably could be mobilized by the Afghans for guerrilla action. In the summer of 1979, numerous Baluch leaders (and some Pathans, their Islamic faith notwithstanding) affirmed to this author their strong support of the Marxist regime in Afghanistan. 'What choice have Baluchis got', remarked one, 'but to be Marxists?' At a meeting in Quetta in August 1979, members of the militant and influential Baluchistan Students Organization, which has been spearheading a growing pan-tribal Baluch nationalism, plastered the city's walls with leftist slogans praising the Khalq government of Afghanistan and its Soviet ally.

For their part, Afghanistan's leaders lost no time in affirming the inseparability of Baluchis and Pathans. In one of his first public statements upon becoming president of Afghanistan at the time of the Soviet intervention, Babrak Karmal, as had both of his Pashtun predecessors Taraki and Amin, pointedly announced his backing for the 'legitimate aspirations' of both the Pathan and Baluch tribes.⁸³ Drew Middleton, the *New York Times* military affairs specialist, reported that upwards of 300 Soviet agents were at work among the Baluchis in 1980, most of them in Afghanistan.⁸⁴ Hovering over all these developments were Afghan-Soviet intentions in regard to the 'Pashtunistan' question, which had suddenly acquired a lethal dimension.

THE 'PASHTUNISTAN' QUESTION

With the approach of Britain's withdrawal from the subcontinent after World War II, hopes were rekindled in Kabul that the tribal territories lost a century earlier – and in whose affairs the Durrani Afghan kingdom, notwithstanding treaty commitments, had never ceased to be a major participant – could finally be recovered. The Afghans tried to persuade the British to renegotiate the boundary and made public their opposition to the Partition Plan a few months before the transfer of power. But their efforts failed. The Pathans gave resounding approval to union with Pakistan in the July referendum and when Pakistan was born on 15 August 1947, the Durand Line stood as its permanent frontier (see Appendix II for chronology of events).

In Afghanistan's frustrated aspirations for the unification of Pathans east and west of the boundary were laid the foundations of the Pashtunistan (also Pathanistan, Pakhtoonistan, etc.) question, an issue which has heavily burdened Afghan-Pakistan relations ever since 1947.⁸⁵ It was largely responsible for the complete severance of diplomatic relations on two occasions (1955, 1961); for the repeated disruption of trade between and transit through both countries (a matter with particularly severe consequences for the economy of landlocked Afghanistan); for literally hundreds of border violations; for several major outbreaks of armed violence involving thousands of tribal and/or regular forces (especially in the periods 1950-1951, 1960-1961); and for the persistence of a situation readily susceptible to external manipulation. It has very heavily influenced the history of Soviet and United States involvement in the region, militarily and otherwise.

There is no universally accepted definition of the Pashtunistan claim. In its mildest form (espoused on some occasions by the Pakistani Pathan leader Abdul Ghaffar Khan), it requires little more than renaming of the province and local self-government within Pakistan.⁸⁶ In its boldest formulation, it envisions a fully independent Pathan state. In territorial terms, it may conform essentially to the present boundaries of the NWFP or embrace all of Pakistan west of the Indus River and south to the Arabian Sea.

While achievement of a separate Pashtunistan would seem to legitimate rather than undo the division between Pathans living east and west of the Durand Line, some of the inspiration for the Pashtunistan demand has undoubtedly stemmed, nonetheless, from Afghan irredentism. As Qureshi points out, the demand for Pashtunistan has represented only one part of the Afghan approach to the frontier issue: parallel to the demand for a Pathan state separate from both Pakistan and Afghanistan was the Afghan demand for renegotiation of the international boundary engineered by British diplomacy at the end of the 19th century.⁸⁷ Repeated denunciation of the Durand Line, in spite of its seeming incompatibility with the Pashtunistan claim, naturally fed suspicion in

Pakistan that naked self-interest in a Greater Afghanistan lurked within the altruistic call for Pashtunistan.

The Pashtunistan claim is not simply irredentist, however. More secure access to the sea (or to the mineral and other resources of the Baluchistan 'corridor') is alone a powerful incentive. An equally powerful incentive, perhaps, is simply the physical survival of Afghanistan, whose own ethnic integrity, in the absence of sustained attacks on its neighbour's, might be thought in jeopardy. While the Afghan government has taken no care to exclude from Pashtunistan the non-Pathan groups (Nuristanis, Hazaras, Chitralis, Sindhis, Brahuis, Baluchis) settled inconveniently within its proposed boundaries, it has always been noticeably careful to exclude its own Pathans, lest the claim for Pashtunistan result inadvertently in a truncated Afghanistan (or in a Greater Pakistan). Were political amalgamation ever to come, Caroe warned darkly some years ago, 'Peshawar would absorb Kabul, not Kabul Peshawar'.⁸⁸

The Pashtunistan issue has waxed and waned over the last several years in response both to internal as well as external pressures. Pakistan's announcement of the One Unit scheme in 1955, from the Afghan point of view at least, heaped insult on top of injury. It precipitated massive demonstrations in Afghanistan, followed by counter-demonstrations in Pakistan leading ultimately to a diplomatic rupture, the mobilization of Afghan armed forces, the suspension of trade and transit for five months, and – of greatest long-term significance – a more receptive atmosphere for the major Soviet economic and military aid overtures which commenced late that year with the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Kabul.⁸⁹

Sardar Daoud Khan's forced resignation from the position of Prime Minister in 1963, the result in no small measure of widespread dissatisfaction with his hardline and economically painful Pashtunistan policy, sparked an almost immediate improvement in relations with Pakistan. His return to power ten years later (1973) coincided with the brief NAP interlude and outbreak of tribal rebellion across the border in Baluchistan. Afghan support of that rebellion and for Baluch and Pathan demands for regional autonomy again strained relations with Islamabad. The promising efforts of Daoud and Bhutto to effect a reconciliation in the summer of 1976 fell victim almost immediately to dramatic political turnabouts in both countries – Bhutto's overthrow in 1977, Daoud's in 1978. The latter event resurrected the demand for Pashtunistan, joined this time, however, with a simultaneous and carefully orchestrated appeal to Baluch cultural nationalism (discussed above).

The Baluch have reciprocated with warm demonstrations of approval for the new regime in Kabul, much as they had done in return for Afghan support in the time of Daoud Khan. Observers may wonder how Baluch claims for autonomy or for their own Greater Baluchistan can be reconciled with the demand for Pashtunistan, when it seems to embrace much of Baluch territory.⁹⁰ The NAP period stands as evidence, nonetheless, that Pathans and Baluchis can collaborate politically. Whether they can move from an expedient political alliance to disposal of fundamental territorial questions – including the vexing matter of Quetta, the Pathan-dominated but Baluch-coveted provincial capital – remains in doubt.

The demand for Pashtunistan has always sounded less strongly in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. This has probably been the result in part of Pakistan's policies toward the Centrally Administered Tribal Areas, where the British tradition of subsidy and tolerance of local autonomy continues essentially unimpaired. It has also been due in some measure to the powerful economic ties which have developed over many decades between the NWFP and the rest of Pakistan (and to the lack of compensating economic attractions in Afghanistan). It has probably been related as well to the fact, discussed earlier, that Pathans have enjoyed extraordinary prominence in Pakistan's military establishment and, as direct outgrowth of that, in its ruling circles.

Events now unfolding in the region are bound to influence the course taken by the Pashtunistan demand in the 1980s. One such event is the flood of refugees into Pakistan from strife-torn Afghanistan.

THE PROBLEM OF AFGHAN REFUGEES

By the end of 1980, the refugee exodus from Afghanistan had reached staggering proportions. There were reportedly 1,267,000

refugees in Pakistan and about 250,000 in Iran.⁹¹ Most were in government camps set up in the border areas. In Pakistan, about 80% of the refugees were located in the NWFP and about 20% were in Baluchistan. Some 40,000-60,000 additional refugees were said to be arriving in Pakistan each month.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees appealed in summer 1980 for \$100 million in international emergency aid to relieve Pakistan of bearing the entire burden of caring for the homeless Afghans – amongst whom women, children, the aged, sick and wounded predominated. The International Red Cross, the United Nations Children's Fund, the Afghanistan Relief Committee and a number of other government and private agencies also offered assistance. The strain of Pakistan's resources was nonetheless enormous.

Apart from humanitarian and economic considerations, the refugee situation posed an immediate security dilemma for Pakistan. The various Afghan resistance groups functioned openly in the camps; and insurgent fighters moved freely back and forth across the border. Whatever may have been its intentions (Islamabad consistently maintained that its policy was one of strict non-interference in Afghan affairs), the government of Pakistan had the capacity neither effectively to police the border nor to compel acquiescence to its policies by all those who dwelt in the highlands on both sides of it. Between Islamabad and Kabul stood the Pathan tribal belt, amongst whose inhabitants small arms manufacture and smuggling had long since reached the state of a high art. There was never any question that they were at least indirect participants in the insurrection against the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul. As a result, the threat of Afghan (or Soviet) retaliation against Pakistan, and of a widened battleground, loomed ever larger.

The massive influx of refugees, the overwhelming majority of whom were Pashtun tribesmen from Afghanistan's eastern provinces, also created difficulty in regard to the ethno-political balance in Pakistan. There would have been little problem had the refugees been merely temporary sojourners, awaiting the cessation of hostilities or a change in regime so that they might return home in safety. But many knowledgeable observers were agreed that most of the refugees, in spite of claims to the contrary, would never leave Pakistan.⁹²

Wherever the refugees settled, they would necessarily be permanent competitors for limited economic resources. Hence, even in the NWFP, where the population is of the same basic Pashtun stock, some misgivings over the influx was inevitable. But in Baluchistan, where the political fortunes of Baluchis and Pathans depend heavily on the province's ethnic mix, the political repercussions of the refugee problem were certain to be severe.

Earlier in this report, we noted that Pathans were unquestionably the majority group in Baluchistan's northern districts and that they were claiming numerical superiority in the entire province. Baluchis reject such claims, of course, and do what they can to stem the tide of immigrants – both from the NWFP and Afghanistan. But in this they have not been very successful. Lured by the promise of economic betterment, Afghans of all kinds have been migrating southwards for decades. Many Afghan *Powindahs* (seasonal migrants of the Ghilzai branch of Pathans, who historically competed for pastureland with Baluch tribesmen) have given up their nomadic life and settled down permanently in Pakistan.⁹³ According to one informant, there was only one family of Hazaras (Persian-speaking Shi'ite Afghans) in Baluchistan before independence. Today, according to him, they number 60,000.⁹⁴ Civil strife in Afghanistan has brought several hundred thousand new and probably permanent Pathan migrants to Baluchistan since 1978. Coming on top of an earlier peaceful migration, they are meeting with predictable hostility from elements of the Baluch population. In June 1979, for example, Baluch students clashed violently with refugee groups at Pishin.⁹⁵ And in July 1979, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, influential Brahui tribal leader in Baluchistan and co-founder of the Pakistan National Party, criticized the government for turning Pakistan into a *mohajristan* ('land of immigrants') and demanded that the Afghan refugees be sent back to their own land.⁹⁶ The idea that the refugees were the victims of terrible violence unleashed on their homeland by a cruel and godless Marxist regime and its expansionist Soviet allies was not fully accepted in Baluchistan.

CONCLUSION

The 'tribal problem' in the tri-state region of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan has existed for a very long time. It was a serious problem for the Moguls, Persians, Sikhs, British and numerous others long before the modern nation-state made its appearance in the area. It would certainly exist today even had the 1970s been more placid, even had governments in the region been more stable, even had there been no Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, even were global dependence on Persian Gulf oil far less than it is. There would have been a tribal problem regardless of the events which gave the 'arc of crisis' its name.

The problem has undoubtedly grown more complex and acquired a new vocabulary. Those who contended with it in earlier days did not worry much about social and economic development – about the impact of urbanization and industrialization on population movements; about the commercialization of agriculture and the displacement of nomadic pastoralists; about literacy rates and health care; or about the installation of tubewells or widening use of tractors in tribal areas. At one time, tribal leaders could not invoke the universal right of self-determination, or mobilize their people with the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Until recent decades, governments could not encourage tribal insurrections from afar via international shortwave radio, or crush them with helicopter gunships.

The Baluchis and Pathans are engulfed in a torrent of fundamental social change whose ramifications go well beyond immediate events. Any more than non-tribal peoples in the area, they can not be shielded from some of the harsh consequences of it. The migration in recent decades of hundreds of thousands of tribesmen out of their homelands was precipitated by economic and technological forces against which legislation (even if governments wished it) might prove impotent. Growing global resource scarcities render less probable than ever that exploitation of fossil fuels, mineral and other riches of the tribal areas will be tempered by concern for tribal welfare. The likelihood diminishes that the government of Pakistan, faced with a rapidly mounting population and enormous pressures on limited land and other resources, will sacrifice control over any part of the national economy to the wish for genuine tribal autonomy – or ever seriously consider turning over 40% of its territory to the effective control of 3% of its population.

However defined, whether as improvement of tribal welfare or as prevention of violent conflict, there is clearly no simple remedy for any aspect of the tribal problem we have surveyed. This would be the case even if the governments of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan were committed unwaveringly to improve the lot of tribesmen. It would also be the case even if these governments were left alone to sort out their priorities and organize their resources without external interference. In this region of the world, that is not likely to occur.

The territorial integrity and political independence of these countries have been severely threatened in the contemporary period. The governments of all of them can be expected to argue that sheer survival has priority over the satisfaction of this or that tribe's demands, no matter how just. One may reply that there would have been less threat had these governments all along been more attentive to tribal interests. The dreary truth, however, is that whatever the willingness of these governments, other governments have been motivated to interfere with and to manipulate tribal discontents in the strategically vulnerable border areas.

There is no more explosive tribal situation in the world in the 1980 than that of the Baluchis and Pathans. One has only to observe that as much as 10% of the population of one of the three states, Afghanistan, has recently fled to the other two to recognize the immediate urgency. But one must also recognize that the 'arc of crisis' has become such not only by accident but by the design of political strategists to appreciate how difficult will be the search for peaceful and mutually acceptable resolution.

NOTES

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- ⁴ Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans 550 B.C.-A.D. 1957* (London: Macmillan & Co, 1958), pp.xiv-xv.
- ⁵ James W. Spain, *The Pathan Borderland* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963), pp.54-56.
- ⁶ See, for example, Richard N. Frye, 'Remarks on Baluchi History', *Central Asiatic Journal*, 6 (1961): 44-50; and Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, *Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1974), pp. 53-132.
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- ⁸ Spain, *The Pathan Borderland*, p.188.
- ⁹ Ibid., pp.206-210.
- ¹⁰ Eden Naby, 'The Ethnic Factor in Soviet-Afghan Relations', *Asian Survey*, 20, No.3 (March 1980): 240.
- ¹¹ Selig Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan', *Foreign Policy*, No.32 (Fall 1978): 137
- ¹² For an argument in support of a larger estimate, see Baloch, *Searchlights on Baloches*, pp.15-24.
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- ¹⁵ Government of Pakistan, Office of the Census Commissioner, *Population Census of Pakistan, 1961*, District Census Report (Quetta/Pishin), p.IV/19.
- ¹⁶ Philip C. Salzman, 'National Integration of the Tribes in Modern Iran', *The Middle East Journal*, 25, No.3 (Summer 1971): 334; and Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan', 145.
- ¹⁷ Lawrence Ziring, 'Pakistan's Nationalities Dilemma: Domestic and International Implications', in *The Subcontinent in World Politics*, Ziring, ed. (New York: Praeger, 1978), p.108. See also Shahid Javed Burki, 'What Migration to the Middle East May Mean for Pakistan', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 3, No.3 (Spring 1980): 47-73.
- ¹⁸ See Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp.95-111.
- ¹⁹ See, for example, *The New York Times*, 3 September 1980, p.A3.
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- ²¹ Charles Lindholm, 'Contemporary Politics in a Tribal Society: Swat District, NWFP, Pakistan', *Asian Survey*, 19, No.5 (May 1979): 490.
- ²² Philip C. Salzman, 'Continuity and Change in Baluchi Tribal Leadership', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 4, No.4 (October 1973): 429; and Swidler, 'Brahui Political Organization', 117. See also R. N. Pehrson, *The Social Organization of the Marri Baluch* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1977), pp.17-32.
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- ²⁴ Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p.94.
- ²⁵ Charles Issawi, 'The Iranian Economy 1925-1975: Fifty Years of Economic Development', in *Iran Under the Pahlavis*, Lenczowski, ed., p.145.
- ²⁶ *Population Census of Pakistan, 1961*, Census Bulletin 4, p.xi.
- ²⁷ Salzman, 'Continuity and Change', 430-432.
- ²⁸ Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto*, pp.145-146, 151; and Satish Kumar, *The New Pakistan* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), p.205.
- ²⁹ Akhtar H. Siddiqi, 'Manufacturing and Planning Industrial Development in Pakistan', *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 70, No.4 (1979): 194-206.
- ³⁰ On the other hand, a few tribal leaders have apparently become multi-millionaires from mining operations in the province. Anwar Syed, 'Pakistan and its Neighborhood: Pressures and Politics', *International Security Review*, 4, No.4 (Winter 1979-80): 421.
- ³¹ Sylvia A. Matheson, *The Tigers of Baluchistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp.202-204.
- ³² Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p.492.
- ³³ *The New York Times*, 31 July 1980, p.A19.
- ³⁴ Jon W. Anderson, 'There Are No Khans Anymore: Economic Development and Social Change in Tribal Afghanistan', *The Middle East Journal*, 32, No.2 (Spring 1978): 167-183.
- ³⁵ Lindholm, 'Contemporary Politics in a Tribal Society', 498-500.
- ³⁶ Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto*, p.11.
- ³⁷ Ibid., pp.29-30, 34-35.
- ³⁸ Stephen P. Cohen, *Security Decision-Making in Pakistan*, report prepared for the Office of External Research, Department of State, Contract No. 1722-020167 (September 1980), p.40.
- ³⁹ Khalid B. Sayeed, 'Pathan Regionalism', *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 63, No.4 (Autumn 1964): 504.
- ⁴⁰ Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto*, pp.103-105.
- ⁴¹ Cohen, *Security Decision-Making in Pakistan*, p.40.
- ⁴² Shaheen Mozaffar, 'The Politics of Cabinet formation in Pakistan: A Study of Recruitment to the Central Cabinets, 1947-1977' (Ph.D. Dissertation, Miami University, Ohio, 1980).
- ⁴³ Statement made to the author in Quetta in August 1979. The situation is due partially, no doubt, to the relatively backward state of education in the province. For a related document, see Stephen L. Pastner, 'Lords of the Desert Border: Frontier Feudalism in Southern Baluchistan and Eastern Ethiopia', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 10 (1979): 99.
- ⁴⁴ Spain, *The Pathan Borderland*, p.221.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., pp.205-206. See also Wayne A. Wilcox, *Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp.75-81.
- ⁴⁶ Herbert Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp.204-205.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., pp.205-208.
- ⁴⁸ Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto*, p.93.
- ⁴⁹ See Article 199(3A) in Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan* (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1977), pp.99-100.
- ⁵⁰ Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan', 139.

- ⁵¹ Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on Baluchistan* (Rawalpindi, 19 October 1974), p.39.
- ⁵² See, for example, Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto*, p.96; Syed, 'Pakistan and its Neighborhood', 420; and Kumar, *The New Pakistan*, pp.329-331.
- ⁵³ For text of the Agreement, see *ibid.*, pp.10-11.
- ⁵⁴ See *White Paper on Baluchistan*.
- ⁵⁵ See Attorney General Yahya Bakhtiar's Opening Address in the Supreme Court of Pakistan on 'The Dissolution of National Awami Party' (Rawalpindi, 19, 20 and 23 June 1975).
- ⁵⁶ Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis*, p.195. Sardari was restored in 1969.
- ⁵⁷ According to one report, as many as 7,000 Pakistani Baluch families remain yet in Afghanistan. Salamat Ali, 'Baluchistan: An Upheaval is Forecast', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 19 October 1979, p.40.
- ⁵⁸ *Dawn*, 5 July 1979.
- ⁵⁹ *The New York Times*, 30 November 1979, p.A6.
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- ⁶² Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1979), pp.59-62. See also Salzman, 'National Integration of the Tribes in Modern Iran'.
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- ⁶⁴ Salzman, 'National Integration of the Tribes in Modern Iran', 332-333.
- ⁶⁵ Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan', 155-156; Naby, 'The Ethnic Factor in Soviet-Afghan Relations', 102.
- ⁶⁶ Salzman, 'Continuity and Change in Baluchi Tribal Leadership', 432-433.
- ⁶⁷ *The New York Times*, 16 January 1980, p.A6; *The State* (Columbia, S.C.), 23 December 1979.
- ⁶⁸ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp.441-457.
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- ⁷³ Spain, *The Pathan Borderland*, pp.244-260.
- ⁷⁴ For background, see Zalmay Khalilzad, 'The Superpowers and the Northern Tier', *International Security* (Winter 1979-80): 6-30.
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- ⁸⁷ Qureshi, 'Pakhtunistan', 110.
- ⁸⁸ Caroe, *The Pathans*, p.437.
- ⁸⁹ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p.508.
- ⁹⁰ For maps showing the various overlapping claims, see L.F. Rushbrook Williams, *Pakistan Under Challenge* (London: Stacey International, 1975), pp.51, 92-93.
- ⁹¹ *The New York Times*, 26 December 1980, p.Y7.
- ⁹² *The New York Times*, 12 June 1980, p.A6, and 21 June 1980, p.23.
- ⁹³ For background on Powindahs, see Spain, *The Pathan Borderland*, pp.56-58.
- ⁹⁴ Statement made in private correspondence to the author.
- ⁹⁵ Muslim, 1 July 1979 (summarized in Public Opinion Trends Analyses and News Service/POT, Pakistan Series, 7:141, 3 July 1979, p.1159).
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APPENDIX I

INSURRECTION IN BALUCHISTAN: A Chronology

20 Dec 1971	Bhutto takes over as President of Pakistan; ban on NAP lifted.	31 Dec 1973	Governor Akbar Khan Bugti leaves office; Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, the Khan of Kalat, takes over as Governor.
27 Apr 1972	Baluchistan Province begins self-rule under Interim Constitution; NAP-JUI coalition government formed under terms of Tripartite Agreement with Bhutto's PPP; NAP leaders Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Ataullah Khan Mengal named Governor and Chief Minister.	14 Apr 1974	Bhutto declares amnesty for all captives in Baluchistan and announces that all military operations in support of civil administration in Baluchistan to cease on 15 May.
27 Nov 1972	Attacks on Punjabi settlers by Marri, Kahloie, and Lehri tribesmen reported in Pat Feeder area of Katchhi district.	8 Jul 1974	NAP President Wali Khan, in press conference at Quetta, accuses Bhutto government of using aircraft against Marri tribals.
9 Feb 1973	Federal forces ordered to Las Bela district, near Karachi, to repel reported tribal invaders.	13 Jul 1974	Karachi weekly <i>Outlook</i> exposes spread of insurrection in Baluchistan; emergence of PFA (Popular Front of Armed Resistance Against National Oppression and Exploitation in Baluchistan) reported.
10 Feb 1973	Arms cache discovered in Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad; Bhutto government alleges link with NAP in Baluchistan.	15 Oct 1974	Bhutto announces end of organized resistance in speech at Quetta; states that full amnesty granted over 5,000 Marri and Mengal tribesmen claimed to have surrendered or been captured.
14 Feb 1973	NAP Governors dismissed in NWFP and Baluchistan; elected NAP-JUI government dismissed in Baluchistan; Akbar Khan Bugti and Jam Ghulam Qadir appointed Governor and Chief Minister of Baluchistan.	19 Oct 1974	Government issues <i>'White Paper on Baluchistan'</i> ; blames NAP 'secessionists' for tribal strife.
15 Feb 1973	NAP-JUI government in NWFP resigns in protest.	8 Feb 1975	Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao, PPP leader and provincial Home Minister in NWFP, assassinated in Peshawar.
10 Apr 1973	Permanent Constitution adopted by National Assembly.	9 Feb 1975	Mass arrests of NAP leaders, including Wali Khan; government alleges sabotage.
18 May 1973	Ambush of eight Dir Scouts near Sibi by Marri tribesmen reported; first major action against government forces.	10 Feb 1975	Government decrees ban on NAP.
August 1973	NAP leaders Khair Bakhsh Marri, Ataullah Khan Mengal, and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo detained.	31 Dec 1975	President's (Federal) Rule imposed in Baluchistan; provincial legislature suspended and government dismissed.
14 Aug 1973	Permanent Constitution promulgated; Bhutto assumes office of Prime Minister.	8 Apr 1976	Abolition of sardari system announced by Bhutto in speech at Quetta.
20 Nov 1973	Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai, key anti-NAP Pathan political figure in Baluchistan, assassinated in Quetta.	30 Jun 1976	President's Rule lifted; provincial legislature revived under Governor's Rule.
		7 Mar 1977	Elections held for National Assembly; allegations of PPP rigging precipitate nationwide violence.
		5 Jul 1977	Bhutto's government overthrown by military; Martial Law declared by General Zia ul-Haq.
		9 Dec 1977	Martial Law government releases Wali Khan and other NAP leaders from prison; insurrection ended.

APPENDIX II

THE 'PASHTUNISTAN' QUESTION: A Chronology

12 Nov 1893	Durand Agreement establishes Durand Line as boundary between British India and Afghanistan.	23 Sep 1955	Pakistan joins US-backed Baghdad Pact (CENTO).
3 Jun 1947	Announcement of Partition Plan for Indian sub-continent reopens dispute over possession of Tribal Territories.	December 1955	Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev visit Kabul; express 'sympathy' for Afghanistan's Pashtunistan policy.
21 Jun 1947	Afghan Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Khan reveals Afghan sentiments in regard to the boundary question in interview at Bombay; Afghanistan's need for a corridor to the Arabian Sea asserted; Afghan support indicated for Pathan independence or incorporation in Afghanistan.	March 1956	SEATO Conference at Karachi endorses Durand Line as international frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
20 Jul 1947	Abdul Ghaffar Khan's <i>Khudai-Kidmatgars</i> boycott British-supervised referendum in NWFP on question of accession to India or Pakistan; union with Pakistan endorsed by overwhelming vote.	September 1957	Full diplomatic relations restored between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
15 Aug 1947	Pakistan becomes independent.	September 1960	Pakistani armed forces repel major Afghan incursion of Pakistani territory at Bajaur.
30 Sep 1947	Afghanistan votes against Pakistan's application for admission to United Nations on grounds that Pakistan resists pacific resolution of Pashtunistan issue (vote retracted same year).	19-21 May 1961	Pakistani armed forces again repel major Afghan incursion of Pakistani territory at Bajaur.
26 Jul 1949	Afghan parliament (<i>Loya Jirgah</i>) votes support for Pashtunistan and officially declares Durand Agreement and other Anglo-Afghan boundary treaties null and void.	August 1961	Pakistan bans entry of Afghan nomads (<i>Powindahs</i>) into Pakistan; requests that Afghanistan close consular and trade missions in Pakistan.
August 1949	Afghan government announces support of 'Pashtunistan Government' founded by groups of dissident tribals in Pakistan's Tribal Territories; radio and press denunciations of Pakistan intensified.	7 Sep 1961	Diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan severed for second time; trade and transit suspended.
July 1950	Soviet Union concludes trade and transit agreements with Afghanistan.	9 Mar 1963	Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan, Afghan Prime Minister and major protagonist of Pashtunistan, resigns.
1950 – 1951	Afghan tribal raids on Pakistan border areas reported; Pakistan interferes with transit of Afghan import/export trade through port of Karachi.	29 May 1963	Teheran Agreement restores diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan after 22 months; frontier re-opened and trade resumed; Pashtunistan issue becomes dormant.
19 May 1954	Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement concluded between Pakistan and the United States.	2 Sep 1969	Pakistani Pathan leader Abdul Wali Khan participates in 'Pashtunistan Day' festivities held at Kabul.
8 Sep 1954	Pakistan joins US-backed Manila Pact (SEATO).	17 Jul 1973	King Zahir Shah overthrown in Kabul; Daoud Khan returns to power; Afghanistan declared a republic.
March 1955	Afghan government denounces proposed One Unit scheme in Pakistan.	1973–1977	Afghanistan provides sanctuary for Baluch guerrillas during tribal rebellion in Pakistan; Afghan propaganda couples appeal for 'Greater Baluchistan' with demand for Pashtunistan.
30 Mar 1955	Pakistan Embassy in Kabul ransacked by mob; flag of Pashtunistan hoisted on Embassy flagpole; Afghan consulate in Peshawar later attacked in retaliation.	7-11 Jun 1976	Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan makes state visit to Kabul; reconciliation set in motion.
May 1955	Diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan severed following widespread demonstrations in both countries; Afghan armed forces mobilized; trade and transit suspended for five months.	21-24 Aug 1976	President Daoud Khan of Afghanistan returns visit; both sides agree to resolve Pashtunistan issue peacefully.
		27 Apr 1978	Daoud government overthrown in Marxist coup; <i>Khalq</i> leader Nur Mohammad Taraki becomes President of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; hard line on Pashtunistan revived; anti-government insurgency launched.
		14 Sep 1979	Taraki government overthrown; power seized by Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin; tribal rebellion spreads.
		24-27 Dec 1979	Soviet armed forces invade Afghanistan; Amin government overthrown; <i>Parcham</i> leader Babrak Karmal becomes President.

Appendix III

PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA AGAINST SARDARI SYSTEM DURING BHUTTO ERA





Table 1: POPULATION ACCORDING TO MOTHER TONGUE IN PAKISTAN, 1961*

Language	Number of Speakers	Per cent of Total
Punjabi	26,186,000	66.39
Pashtu**	3,340,000	8.47
Sindhi	4,964,000	12.59
Urdu	2,988,000	7.57
Baluchi	983,000	2.49
Brahui	366,000	0.93
Bengali	46,000	0.12
Persian	26,000	0.07
English	17,000	0.04
Arabic	3,000	0.01
Others	523,000	1.32
Total	39,442,000	100.00

* East Pakistan is excluded from this tabulation.

** Several million persons living in the tribal belt, the vast majority of them Pashto-speaking, were not enumerated.

Source: Government of Pakistan, Office of the Census Commissioner, *Population Census of Pakistan, 1961*.

Table 2: POPULATION ACCORDING TO MOTHER TONGUE IN BALUCHISTAN (PAKISTAN), 1961

Language	Number of Speakers	Per cent of Total
Baluchi	420,431	33.50
Pashtu	351,041	28.00
Brahui	197,568	15.70
Sindhi	152,947	12.20
Punjabi	90,221	7.20
Urdu	21,521	1.70
Persian	15,663	1.20
Others	2,445	0.10
Total	1,251,837	100.00

Source: Government of Pakistan, Office of the Census Commissioner, *Population Census of Pakistan, 1961*.

Table 3: POPULATION OF THE NWFP (PAKISTAN), BY DIVISION AND DISTRICT, 1961 and 1972*

Division	1972	1961
Peshawar Division	5,498,137	3,746,870
Hazara District	2,007,575	1,384,552
Mardan District	1,198,000	813,840
Peshawar District	1,711,368	1,170,183
Kohat	581,194	378,304
Dera Ismail Khan Division	1,041,412	727,548
Dera Ismail Khan District	477,837	352,247
Bannu District	563,575	375,299
Malakand Division	1,707,836	1,256,586
Dir District	522,068	385,183
Chitral District	158,976	113,057
Swat District	934,338	624,699
Malakand District	182,454	133,627
Centrally Administered Tribal Areas**	2,485,887	1,847,195
Peshawar Tribal Area	60,132	43,285
Kohat Tribal Area	322,997	249,491
D. I. Khan Tribal Area	76,472	30,499
Bannu Tribal Area	63,882	52,762
Malakand Agency	364,050	280,200
Mohmand Agency	382,922	294,215
Khyber Agency	377,001	301,319
Kurram Agency	280,234	200,512
North Waziristan Agency	250,663	159,470
South Waziristan Agency	307,514	235,442
Total	10,823,252	7,578,186

* 1961 Census data have been adjusted for 1972 Census areas.

** Figures are officially estimated.

Source: Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, *Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 1976*.

Table 4: POPULATION OF BALUCHISTAN (PAKISTAN), BY DIVISION AND DISTRICT, 1961 and 1972*

Division/District	1972	1961
Quetta Division	1,308,001	731,785
Quetta-Pishin District	494,928	267,400
Sibi District	402,977	224,696
Loralai District	184,797	110,720
Zhab District	161,127	87,686
Chagai District	62,172	41,263
Kalat Division	1,099,153	621,719
Kalat District	320,519	156,471
Kachhi District	266,041	184,949
Kharan District	75,509	42,483
Makran District	301,109	146,990
Las Bela District	135,975	90,826
Total	2,405,154	1,353,484

* 1961 Census data have been adjusted for 1972 Census areas.

Source: Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, *Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 1976*.

